On Some Limitations of Humean Disagreement: Miraculous Testimony and Contrary Religions

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Abstract As part of his wider critique of the credibility of miraculous testimony, Hume also offers a rather curious argument as to the mutual detriment of conflicting testimony for the miracles of contrary religious worldviews. Scholarship on this aspect of Hume's reasoning has debated whether or not the considerations are to be understood as essentially probabilistic, and as to whether or not a probabilistic interpretation of the argument is logically valid. The consensus would appear to offer a positive answer to the first question and a negative answer to the second. In this paper I expose a deeper fallacy in Hume's reasoning that undermines both probabilistic and non-probabilistic readings. My critique is closely based upon analogous considerations in the philosophy of science, and the equally intriguing issue as to the epistemological relevance of conflicting scientific theories throughout the history of science.

Keywords Miracles · Testimony · Contrary religions · David Hume

Introduction: Incredible Testimony

In Section X of his *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, David Hume offers a number of well-known arguments against the credibility of any testimony to the effect that a miraculous event has occurred. Hume offers both a general epistemological consideration for discounting miraculous testimony and a number of more specific observations to this effect. The central idea is that since – by definition – any miraculous occurrence would contravene all of our previous experience with respect to the structure and uniformity of nature, any testimony to that effect will always be less credible than the supposition that the testifier is deluded, or perhaps even attempting to deceive us. The more specific observations

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offer a rather disparaging account of the intellectual pedigree of those who have actually offered such testimony.[1] Moreover, and more importantly with respect to the concerns of the present paper, Hume also argues that since many of these individually unreliable testimonial reports *conflict* with one another, we have even further reason to dispute their credibility. The fact is that not all miracles are created equal, since they will be associated with distinct – and mutually incompatible – religious worldviews. Thus, testimonial evidence for the occurrence of one miraculous event, which in itself would provide support for the truth of one particular religion, is *ipso facto* testimonial evidence against the truth of any contrary religion. The final step of the argument is then to note that since we have numerous different testimonial reports for numerous different miraculous events, all of which are associated with numerous different and mutually incompatible religions, the net result is a zero-sum game: testimony for the occurrence of the miracles of one religion is testimony against the occurrence of the miracles of any other religion, and so our miraculous testimony as a whole is mutually undermined, leaving us with no compelling testimonial evidence for any of the religious worldviews in question.

In this paper, I am concerned solely with this latter argument regarding conflicting testimony. The problem with this argument is that it is straightforwardly fallacious. The fallacy however is also rather subtle, and further obscured by some interpretative difficulties regarding the argument as a whole. Yet our suspicions should at least be piqued by the realisation that, irrespective of our views concerning the credibility of miraculous testimony in general, such a line of thought threatens to prove far too much – that whenever we have a case of disagreement, both points of view are thereby rendered less credible. The absurdity of such a conclusion is particularly blatant when the disagreement concerns a logically contradictory (and therefore mutually exhaustive) set of beliefs, where all we would be entitled to conclude is that *at least one* of our propositions is *definitely false*, and not – as Hume would appear to suggest – that *all* of our propositions are *probably false*.

Nevertheless, the precise flaw in this aspect of Hume's argument is difficult to untangle, and to this end I shall attempt to illustrate the fallacy through a comparison with a similar (and considerably more blatant) error sometimes perpetrated in the philosophy of science. This methodology is designed to serve a dual purpose, for there are in general argumentative strategies in the philosophy of science and the philosophy of religion relevant to, but as yet not fully appreciated by, the other. I have as my guide here some of the later work of Peter Lipton (2007), who has explored the extent to which the various ways in which philosophers of science have attempted to understand and explain conceptual dislocation in scientific practice – as arising from a discontinuous revolution in one's scientific worldview, or simply through the continuing epistemic management of theory and anomaly – can provide a fruitful framework for thinking about the relationship between the religious and the secular more broadly. This paper attempts to further this project by applying some of Lipton's work in the epistemology of science to the epistemology of religion.

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[1] There is room for some disagreement concerning the overall architectonic of Hume's argument, but in this respect I agree with Fogelin (2003).

Providence, Probability and Proof

The precise argument with which we are concerned comes from the following familiar section of the *Enquiry*:

> Let us consider that in matters of religion whatever is different is contrary, and that it is impossible the religions of ancient Rome, of Turkey, of Siam, and of China should all of them be established on any solid foundation. Every miracle, therefore, pretended to have been wrought in any of these religions (and all of them abound in miracles), as its direct scope is to establish the particular system to which it is attributed, so has it the same force, though more indirectly, to overthrow every other system. In destroying a rival system, it likewise destroys the credit of those miracles on which that system was established, so that all the prodigies of different religions are to be regarded as contrary facts, and the evidence of these prodigies, whether weak of strong, opposite to each other. (Hume, 1975: 121ff).

The argument is however somewhat opaque, and there are a number of interpretative issues that need to be resolved before the reasoning can be assessed. The most important is whether the argument is meant to be understood *probabilistically* or *non-probabilistically*. Hume writes of the 'direct scope' of a reported miracle being to 'establish' the religious worldview with which it is associated and of having the 'same force' to 'overthrow' anything to the contrary. However, talk of establishing and overthrowing is potentially ambiguous, and such terminology needs to be rendered more precise before we can continue. Generally speaking, there are two ways in which we can proceed. The probabilistic interpretation of Hume's argument takes this talk of establishing and overthrowing to be essentially *inductive* – testimony to the effect that a miracle having occurred makes the associated religious worldview *more likely* to be true and anything to the contrary *less likely* to be true. By contrast, the non-probabilistic interpretation takes the central relationship to be essentially *deductive* – the testimony in question is taken to *conclusively prove* the relevant religion and to *conclusively disprove* its rivals. Neither interpretation however is valid; we shall consider each in turn.

In one of the few studies of Hume's argument regarding conflicting testimony, Langtry (1971; 1985) maintains that the reasoning in question must be understood as essentially *probabilistic*. This follows from Langtry's understanding of the evidential relationship between the occurrence of a miraculous event and the religious worldview with which it is associated. According to Langtry, such a relationship can only be understood along the broadly Bayesian lines of raising one's subjective probability that the religion in question is true – since the alternative (non-probabilistic) account, whereby we understand the occurrence of a miraculous event to *logically entail* the truth of its associated religion, will always presuppose an unwarrantedly strong interpretation of the evidence at hand. Take for example the alleged fact that a man from Nazareth rose from the dead after three days in the tomb; such an event would certainly raise our credence in the truth of Christianity. But such an event would not conclusively prove Christianity, since there are other religious worldviews consistent with an alleged resurrection. Contrast this with the claim regarding the resurrection of Jesus Christ, the Son of God, eternally begotten of the Father, God from God, Light from Light … This fact *would* conclusively

prove Christianity. The problem of course is that in order to offer such an interpretation of the event in question, we would already need to be convinced of the Christian faith; and this was precisely what such an event was supposed to help establish (Langtry, 1971: 29–30). In short, a non-probabilistic understanding of the evidential relationship between miracle and religion makes any question of the evidential relationship between miracle and religion redundant.

Langtry therefore reconstructs Hume's argument as consisting essentially of the following two claims: that the occurrence of a miraculous event makes its associated religious worldview more likely to be true, and any contrary religious worldview less likely to be true (1971: 29); and therefore by extension, that any testimony to the effect that a miraculous event associated with one particular religion has occurred will thus constitute testimony to the effect that any miraculous event associated with a contrary religion has not occurred – and that any testimony regarding the miracles of this contrary religion must therefore be considered even less credible (ibid.: 31–32). The conclusion of the argument then is that, since there are plenty of contrary religions all offering testimony with respect to their own miraculous evidence, all such testimony is mutually undermined: testimony for one miraculous occurrence, by providing support for its respective religion, will discredit any contrary religion and thus any testimony offered in its support; while testimony for another miraculous occurrence, by providing support for its respective religion, will similarly discredit the first religion and any testimony offered in its support. Thus we are left without grounds for accepting any miraculous testimony whatsoever.

It is relatively easy to see the problem with this argument: as Langtry (1971: 30–31) points out, it is not a theorem of the probability calculus that evidence that favours one hypothesis over a contrary hypothesis will also provide evidence *against* the latter. It may just be the case that the evidence in question provides greater support for one hypothesis than it does for another. In the particular case canvassed above then, it is also not generally the case that miraculous evidence for one religion will provide miraculous evidence against a contrary religion; and thus by extension, it is also not generally the case that testimony for the occurrence of one religion's miracles will therefore undermine the credibility of any miraculous testimony for the occurrence of a contrary religion's miracles. I testify to a miraculous event that if true would strongly favour one religion over another; you testify to a separate miraculous event that if true would strongly favour the second religion over the first. Does my reliability as a testifier undermine your testimony? Not necessarily – for I am at least endorsing your claim that the laws of nature are sometimes violated.

Langtry's interpretation – and his subsequent evaluation – of Hume's argument has however been challenged. According to Conway (1983), the central evidential relationship between miraculous event and religious worldview has to be understood as one of *logical entailment* such that the occurrence of a particular miracle *guarantees* the truth of its irrespective religion and therefore *guarantees* the falsity of any contrary religion (ibid.: 4). Hume's argument then proceeds much as before, except that it now concerns the miraculous *proof* of our contrary religions rather than their miraculous *evidence*; and therefore by extension that any testimony to the effect that a miraculous event associated with one particular religion has occurred will thus constitute testimony to the effect that any miraculous event associated with a contrary religion has not occurred – and that any testimony regarding the miracles of

this contrary religion must therefore be considered as *definitely false*. The conclusion of the argument then is the even stronger one that, since there are plenty of contrary religions all offering testimony with respect to their own miraculous evidence, all such testimony is mutually *refuted* – leaving us with presumably even fewer reasons for accepting any miraculous testimony whatsoever.

There are textual and historical grounds both for and against interpreting Hume's argument in this logically stronger, and essentially non-probabilistic, manner [see Conway (1983) and Langtry (1985), respectively; Garrett (2002) provides a more recent overview of the issue]. In this paper, we are principally concerned with the philosophical merits of each interpretation. Conway argues that logical entailment is the only satisfactory way in which to understand the evidential relationship between miracle and religion. He argues that if miracles were only to provide non-conclusive (that is, probabilistic) evidence for their respective religions, then 'it must be that miracles may occur other than in conjunction with a true religion' (1983: 7) – a supposition supposedly at odds with Hume's background assumptions, and more importantly, a supposition that would undermine talk of miracles altogether. If miracles do not guarantee their respective religions, Conway argues, then miracles can occur independently of their respective religions; and if this were the case, 'nature would then not be regular in any strong sense, and deviations from its more usual course would not supply evidence for supernatural intervention … the concept of miracle would lose its point' (ibid.). Conway's reasoning for understanding the argument non-probabilistically thus offers an interesting converse to Langtry's reasoning for the contrary. For Langtry, a non-probabilistic understanding of the evidential relationship between miracle and religion would involve such a strong interpretation of the miraculous evidence that we would in effect have already presupposed that which we were attempting to establish – the event would be miraculous, but it could not be said to be evidence. For Conway, a probabilistic understanding of the evidential relationship between miracle and religion would involve such a tenuous link between the two that it would no longer be clear that we were dealing with the supernatural – the event would be evidential, but it could no longer be said to be a miracle.

Unfortunately, Conway's reasoning conflates two distinct notions of probability. Conway's argument concerns a notion of *objective chance*, the probability that an event has of occurring as a matter of brute metaphysical fact, quite independently of our knowledge of that fact. His worry is that if the occurrence of a miracle did not guarantee the truth of its respective religion in this metaphysically robust manner, then the miracle in question might not have been *caused* by its respective religion – which would indeed leave open doubts as to its supernatural providence and of the concept of a miracle in general. But the notion of probability with which we are concerned (and the concept with which Langtry formulates his interpretation) is a notion of *subjective probability* or *credence* – the probability that an event has of occurring *on the basis of our background knowledge*. To say that a miraculous event only provides non-conclusive evidence for its associated religion is not to countenance the possibility that the event may have had an entirely natural origin; it is merely to note that the fact that, regardless of the event's metaphysical pedigree, its mere occurrence leaves underdetermined for us which religion was responsible for its (causally fully determined) existence.

The central argument with which we are concerned maintains that, regardless of the credibility of miraculous testimony in general, the existence of distinct testimonial reports for the miracles of distinct (and mutually incompatible) religious worldviews offers *additional* and *independent* grounds for rejecting such claims. This argument can be understood probabilistically or non-probabilistically, depending upon how we wish to understand the evidential relationship between the occurrence of a miracle and the truth of its associated religion. Langtry has shown that if the argument is understood probabilistically, then it rests upon a deeply flawed understanding of the logic of confirmation, and is straightforwardly invalid. And we have also seen that Conway's argument for understanding the argument non-probabilistically rests upon an elementary confusion between the probability an event has of occurring and how likely such an occurrence seems to us on the basis of our background knowledge. Yet this of course does not settle the case, and to this end I intend to show that a non-probabilistic interpretation of Hume's argument – should motivation for such a reading be forthcoming – is just as fallacious as its probabilistic construal. Indeed, my criticism of the non-probabilistic interpretation is in many ways an extension of Langtry's criticism of the probabilistic interpretation; my argument is therefore also intended to provide a deeper diagnosis of the general fallacy in Hume's reasoning. The basic problem concerns the fact that in order for contrary miraculous testimonial to be *mutually* undermining, one must simultaneously endorse those testimonial reports that one is also rejecting. The point is a subtle one, and in order to bring it into sharper relief, I shall begin with a similar – and hopefully more straightforward – fallacy in the philosophy of science.

Diachronic Disagreement in the History of Science

One central issue in the philosophy of science concerns our grounds for believing our contemporary scientific theories to be true. The evidence at our disposal consists of the range of observable phenomena that occur under specific experimental conditions and the extent to which the scientific theories in question manage to successfully predict these outcomes; the argument in favour of scientific belief is therefore essentially explanatory – that the truth of a scientific theory is the *best explanation* of its observed predictive success. Or in other words – to give the thought an explicitly Humean flavour – the idea is that since it would be always less credible to suppose that a false description of reality could deliver the repeated predictive and manipulative success so clearly enjoyed by our contemporary scientific theories, then it would be to suppose that the theory in question was (at least approximately) true, such reticence could never be rationally compelling (cf. Putnam, 1978: 18–22).

Thus, the occurrence of an observable phenomenon is supposed to give us reasons to believe in the truth of the scientific theory most capable of explaining it, just as the occurrence of a miracle is supposed to give us reasons to believe in the truth of the religious worldview that provides its most compelling explanation; and just as the existence of rival religions – with their conflicting accounts of contrary miracles – is held to undermine our faith in any particular theological supposition, so too is the existence of contrary scientific theories supposed to tarnish our evaluation

of our contemporary scientific worldview. In the case of the philosophy of religion, such disagreement tends to be *synchronic* – the existence of conflicting testimony *at any one moment of time* regarding the occurrence of contrary miraculous events is held to undermine each and every testimonial report under consideration. In the case of the philosophy of science, such disagreement tends to be *diachronic* – the existence of conflicting scientific theories *throughout the history of science* regarding the unobservable structure of reality is held to undermine even our contemporary scientific worldview. In both cases, however, the structure of the argument is essentially the same, and outlining the weaknesses of the latter will help us to appreciate the weaknesses of the former.

With respect to our contemporary scientific theories, the problem is supposed to lie in the fact that previous scientific theories found to be predictively successful in the past have inevitably turned out to be false (cf. Laudan, 1981). There is both a weaker and a stronger application of this observation. The former is simply to note that while truth may well be the *best* explanation of predictive success, it is not always the *correct* explanation, and that we should therefore be cautious in concluding too much regarding our contemporary situation. The latter attempts to draw upon the history of science to furnish a positive argument *against* believing our contemporary scientific theories to be true: if the vast majority of predictively successful scientific theories in the past have turned out to be false, then chances are that any currently predictively success scientific theory will also turn out to be false. This argument is known as the *Pessimistic Meta-Induction* – 'pessimistic' as it draws a strongly negative assessment regarding our contemporary scientific practice; 'meta-inductive' in that it is an inductive inference explicitly targeted at those first-order inductive inference used in initially formulating those theories under assessment.[2]

Yet the fact that the Pessimistic Meta-Induction is concerned with the disagreement that exists between a temporally extended series of scientific theories – as opposed to the simultaneous disagreement between religious testifiers that forms the basis of Hume's argument – makes it easier to see where it goes wrong. We should of course be initially suspicious of any line of reasoning that relies upon an inductive inference to cast dispersions upon our use of inductive inferences. But more specifically, we should pause to consider *how exactly* the history of science is supposed to reflect upon our contemporary scientific practice. The argument is that since all past scientific theories have been shown to be false, then our current scientific theories will probably be shown to be false too. As an inference, this seems fairly straightforward, until we inquire a little deeper into the reasons we have for the initial premise – on what grounds do we suppose that our past scientific theories have been shown to be uniformly false? The fact of the matter is that we only believe our past scientific theories to be false *because they disagree with our contemporary scientific theories*. We no longer

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[2] Some philosophers of science maintain that the history of science does not in fact furnish any *significant* disagreement between successive scientific theories, and that we can therefore reject the Pessimistic Meta-Induction altogether, on the grounds that there exists substantial continuity with respect to the 'core' elements of those theories (e.g. Worrall, 1989). I am unsure of what the parallel may be here for the philosophy of religion.

believe in phlogiston, because we now believe in the oxidisation of metals; we no longer believe in luminiferous ether because we now believe in electromagnetic radiation; we no longer believe in Absolute Space because we now believe in the fundamental relativity of distinct frames of reference. But then, if we only believe that our previous scientific theories are false *on the basis* of our belief that our contemporary scientific theories are (at least approximately) true, we cannot *also* use our belief that our previous scientific theories are false to *undermine* our belief that our contemporary scientific theories are true. We would in effect be maintaining that our contemporary scientific theories are true in order to maintain that our contemporary scientific theories are not true.

Lipton (2000, 200) provides a helpful illumination of this point. Suppose that we have two competing scientific theories, and perform some crucial test that both provides evidence in favour of one theory and simultaneously provides evidence against the other (for example, we test for an observable phenomenon that one theory predicts will definitely occur, and the other predicts will definitely not occur). Since the first theory is thereby confirmed, we have reasons to believe it to be true. Since the second theory has been refuted, we have reasons to believe it to be false. But then, by pessimistic meta-inductive reasoning, the refutation of the second theory also tells against the first – after all, the majority of scientific theories have been refuted, and so chances are that this one will be refuted as well. But then the same experiment provides both direct evidence in favour of the first theory *and* indirect evidence against it. Something has clearly gone wrong. In Lipton's terminology, the argument is a piece of 'judo epistemology' as it 'attempts to use the great progress of science against itself' (ibid., 199–200).

The basic flaw in the argument therefore is the fact that it requires us to endorse the very claim that the argument is meant is undermine – the truth of our contemporary scientific theories is what *justifies* the pessimistic induction to the effect that our contemporary scientific theories are false. Unlike a *reductio* argument, which assumes the truth of a proposition in order to demonstrate the inherent absurdity in so doing, this is an argument that attempts the viciously circular task of endorsing a proposition in order to reject that proposition – not so much as showing that the ladder is unsturdy before one begins to climb as it is climbing to the top of the ladder to prove that it cannot be done. Even more simply, the weakness of the argument can also be seen as just a failure to keep track of one's premises – that in establishing the demoralising history of science upon which the argument depends, one often forgets that one must implicitly assume the truth of those very scientific theories such a historical reconstruction is supposed to overturn.

It is this same fallacy that I contend lies at the heart of Hume's reasoning regarding contrary miraculous testimony – of needing to assume what one is attempting to reject. The fallacy is easier to see in the case of the philosophy of science, precisely because the central disagreement is extended over time: we have a natural tendency to privilege our contemporary scientific theories over their predecessors, and so it is easier to see the way in which the truth of these theories is implicitly assumed in the argument under discussion. The situation is not as salient in the case of contrary miraculous testimony, since we have no corresponding tendency to privilege any particular religious worldview in our evaluation of the argument. Yet nevertheless, the basic problem remains.

'Judo Epistemology' in the Philosophy of Religion

In the case of the Pessimistic Meta-Induction, we noted the peculiarity of offering an inductive argument against the reliability of our inductive practices. More specifically, we noted that the supposedly woeful track record of our past scientific theorising could not provide us with even remotely compelling reasons to distrust our contemporary scientific theorising since such an unfavourable evaluation of the former in fact presupposes our having good reasons to trust the latter. For it is only on the supposition of the (approximate) truth of our current scientific theories that we have the grounds to suppose that our past scientific theories have been uniformly false; and if this is the case, then one can hardly use the latter belief to undermine the former belief upon which it is based.

The logically stronger, essentially non-probabilistic, reading of Hume's argument – whereby one takes the occurrence of a miraculous event to *entail* the truth of one religion, thus to *entail* the falsehood of any religion to the contrary, and therefore to *refute* any miraculous testimony for the latter – is guilty of the same epistemological dishonesty. For Hume's argument is not merely the claim that a miraculous proof of Christianity is *ipso facto* a miraculous disproof of Islam, and thus by extension the conclusive undermining of any purported miraculous testimony for Islam. Rather, the argument seeks to cast all miraculous testimony into doubt on the grounds of their mutual conflict. Testimony to the effect that Christ has risen from the tomb is itself testimony to the effect that Islam is false, and thus undermines any testimony to the effect that the angel Gabriel has dictated the Qur'an to Mohammad; yet since testimony to the effect that the angel Gabriel has dictated the Qur'an to Mohammad is itself testimony to the effect that Christianity is false, it similarly undermines any testimony to the effect that Christ has risen from the tomb – and we are left with no compelling testimony for either creed.[3] But just as we should be suspicious of any argument that attempts to reason inductively against the reliability of induction, so too should we be suspicious of any argument that relies upon the reliability of miraculous testimony in order to discredit miraculous testimony. For if the testimony regarding our Christian miracle really is testimony against Islam (or any other contrary religion), then we have good reasons to distrust any testimony regarding our Islamic miracle. But if we have good reasons to distrust any testimony regarding our Islamic miracle, then we *do not have* any compelling testimony against Christianity – and thus by extension, no independent grounds for rejecting our original miraculous testimony. Or conversely, if we should find the testimony regarding our Islamic miracle overwhelmingly compelling, then we have testimony against the truth of Christianity and grounds to reject any Christian testimony – in which case, we *do not have* any compelling Christian testimony against Islam and no independent grounds for rejecting our Islamic testimony. Either way, a positive evaluation of one testimonial report *precludes* a positive evaluation of any contrary testimonial report, and we never face the situation of our miraculous testimony as a whole simultaneously undermining itself.

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[3] These examples are purely illustrative; I take no issue on the theological compatibility of any particular religious worldviews.

In the case of the Pessimistic Meta-Induction, we only had grounds to doubt the truth of our scientific theories as a whole through assuming the truth of some of those scientific theories; in the case of rival religions, we only have grounds to doubt the reliability of our miraculous testimony as a whole through assuming the reliability of some of that testimony. The existence of conflicting testimonial reports – used themselves in the evaluation of those testimonial reports – can no more undermine the reliability of all such testimony than the existence of contrary scientific theories – used themselves in the evaluation of those scientific theories – can undermine the truth of all such scientific theories. This is the central flaw in Hume's reasoning: of offering one argument for the unreliability of our first miraculous testimony, offering a second – and *mutually exclusive* – argument for the unreliability of our second miraculous testimony, and then attempting to maintain both conclusions at once. This is the basic problem underlying Langtry's observation that probabilistic evidence for one theory over another need not necessarily provide probabilistic evidence against the latter; it also renders a non-probabilistic interpretation of the argument equally fallacious. None of this is to say that we have good reasons to trust any testimony to the effect that a miraculous event has occurred – my argument here does not touch on Hume's central argument to that effect. But what I do hope to have shown is that we do not possess *additional* grounds to distrust *all* miraculous testimony simply on the basis that it sometimes disagrees.

Conclusion

When considering the history of science, we argued inductively for the likely falsehood of any particular scientific theory on the basis of the falsehood of its predecessors, *even though the supposed falsehood of those past scientific theories is in fact incompatible with the supposed falsehood of the contemporary scientific theories in question*. When considering the diversity of miracles, we argued directly for the unreliability of every particular piece of miraculous testimony on the basis of the reliability of its contemporaries, *even though the supposed reliability of that contrary testimony is in fact incompatible with the supposed unreliability of miraculous testimony in general*. The Pessimistic Meta-Induction considers diachronic disagreement; the argument from rival religions considers synchronic disagreement. The former attempts to establish the falsehood of a particular scientific theory on the basis of evidence that in fact presupposes its truth; the latter attempts to establish the unreliability of all miraculous testimony on the basis of evidence that presupposes their individual reliability. Both arguments attempt to use the strength of their opponents against them, and are likewise fallacious.

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